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The Italian Constitutional Court:
Safeguard of the Constitution
I. Introduction
In a country such as Italy, with its legal system's foundations
settled in civil law concepts, it is fascinating to study the functioning
of their Constitutional Court. To begin this journey, it is logical to
start with the formation of the Italian Constitution. When Italy was
rebuilding from their experiences in World War II, it was clear that
the majority of Italians desired a democratic system of government.!
This democracy was created by the Republican Constitution, which
took effect in 1948.
The Constitution begins with the "Fundamental Principles" that
state the basic social, political, and cultural values upon which the
Italian Republic is based . The "Fundamental Principles"3 comprise
the first twelve articles of the Italian Constitution much like how the
"Bill of Rights" compose the initial ten amendments of the
Constitution of the United States. The Italian Constitution is then
divided into two parts. First, is the "Rights and Duties of the
Citizens" and then the "Structure of the Republic., 4 The two parts
total 139 articles
To preserve the integrity of the system, an autonomous body
was needed to independently review the constitutionality of future
legislation.6 Thus, Italy's Constitutional Court was established.7
1. W. Rodino, The Constitutional Court of Italy, SUPRANAT'L & CONST. CrS.
281, 284 (1992).
2. Luigi Moccia, The Italian Legal System in the Comparative Law
Perspective: An Overview, 27 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 230, 236 (1999).
3. See Appendix A for a summary of "fundamental principles."
4. See Moccia, supra note 2, at 236.
5. Id.
6. Antonio Baldassarre,* Structure and Organization of the Constitutional
Court of Italy, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 649, 650 (1996).
* At the time of the essay's publication, Baldassarre was President of the
Constitutional Court of Italy. The essay was followed by a question and answer
session with audience members at Saint Louis University.
7. See Rodino, supra note 1,-at 284.
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This Comment will begin with background information
concerning the Court itself. The composition, functions, and
jurisdiction of the Court will be among the preliminary matters
discussed. Procedural mechanisms that insure the independence of
the judges will also be an important consideration. This section will
give the reader a sense of how the Court operates.
The remainder of the work will concern the current state of the
law regarding selected constitutional issues. First, abortion law will
be discussed. The Comment will focus on how the jurisprudence
concerning abortion has evolved and developed into its current form.
In a related context, the Comment will shift to consider gender
equality. Several decisions will be analyzed to demonstrate how the
constitutional reasoning has evolved. Current issues such as
Pregnant Worker's Rights and Father's Rights will also be discussed.
These topics will illustrate just how the Constitutional Court
operates when faced with controversial decisions regarding the rights
of an individual. It will become clear that the Court decided these
issues with the best interests of Italy and the preservation of the
constitution in mind. The goal of this Comment is to give the reader
an appreciation of the effectiveness of this system of jurisprudence.
II. Background
A. Formation
After the end of the Second World War, the Constitution of the
Italian Republic created a Constitutional Court.! At the
Constitutional Convention it was stressed that rather than ensure the
protection of the individual's constitutional rights, the goal of the
Constitutional Court's judicial review was to ensure that legislation
respected the Constitutional limits imposed upon it.9 A conflict
ensued regarding whether there must be a specific controversy
before the Court, or if the Court could also review legislation
directly." A compromise was reached allowing judicial review to
take either form: direct or indirect." However, it took eight years for
the Constitutional Court system to finally begin its operation in 1956.
8. ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 215
(1989).
9. Allessandro Pizzorusso et al., The Constitutional Review of Legislation in
Italy, 56 TEMP. L. Q. 503, 504 (1983).
10. Id.
11. Law of March 11, 1953, as cited in Pizzorusso, supra note 9, at 531.
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B. Composition
The Constitution created in 1948 provided unique mechanisms
to ensure the independence of the Constitutional Court. In the
Constitution, the Court is not created in the section dealing with the
judiciary, but is in a separate passage dealing with constitutional
guarantees.' 2 A system was created in which the classical powers of a
democratic state were equally represented. 3 Article 135 of the
Constitution provides the formula for the selection of the
Constitutional Court Judges.4 The court is composed of fifteen
judges, one-third selected by the President of the Republic, one-third
selected by Parliament in joint session, and one-third by the highest
ordinary and administrative courts. 5 For the five members of the
Court selected by the highest ordinary and administrative courts,
three judges are elected by the judges of ordinary jurisdiction (Court
of Cassation or Corte di Cassazione), one is elected by the judges of
the Council of State (Consiglio di Stato), and one by the judges of
the Court of Accounts (Corte dei Conti). 6
The five members elected by Parliament must be voted into
office by a majority of at least two-thirds of the members of
Parliament. Three votes may be taken. After the third vote, if they
12. Costituzione (Constitution) [hereinafter COST.] art. 101-112, 134-137.
13. See Rodino, supra note 1, at 286.
14. Article 135 of the Constitution provides:
The Constitutional Court shall be composed of fifteen judges, one-
third selected by the President of the Republic, one-third by Parliament
in joint session, and one-third by the highest ordinary and administrative
courts.
The judges of the Constitutional Court shall be chosen from among
judges or retired judges of the highest ordinary or administrative courts,
from university professors of law, and from lawyers with twenty years of
practice.
The Court shall elect its President from among its own members.
Judges shall be appointed for twelve years.* They shall be replaced in
rotation according to the provisions of the law; and they shall not be
immediately eligible for reappointment.
The office of Judge of the Court shall be incompatible with that of a
member of Parliament or of a Regional Council, or with practice as a
lawyer, or with any other pursuit or office laid down by law.
In judicial proceedings involving the impeachment of the President of
the Republic or a Minister, sixteen lay members shall take part in the
deliberations of the Court with the regular bench. They shall be elected
by the Chambers in joint session from among citizens qualified for
election as Senators, at the beginning of each Parliament.
* Constitutional Law No. 2 of 1967 amended the judge's term from
twelve years to nine years.
15. COST. art. 135, para. 1.
16. Article 2 of Law No. 87 of 1953, as cited in Rodino, supra note 1, at 286.
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do not achieve the majority, then a three-fifths majority of the
members of Parliament is sufficient for the election of a
Constitutional Court judge. 7 The last five judges are appointed by
Italy's head of state, the President of the Republic."8
All fifteen judges must be chosen from among judges or former
judges of the ordinary and administrative supreme courts, university
professors of law, or lawyers who have practiced for at least twenty
years." Judges of the Court may not engage in other careers or
practice law while a judge on the Court. ° In addition, judges are not
allowed to be members of political parties or be involved in political
activities.2
The Court chooses a President from among its members,"
usually considering only the senior members. 2 The President is
elected to a three-year term and is eligible for re-election.24 It is the
job of the President to control the functions of the Court itself."
These duties include tasks such as determining hearing dates and
nominating a judge who must prepare a case to be considered by the
Court.26  The President is also responsible for public relations
appearances and must represent the Court in its affairs with other
powers.27
In Italy a distinction is made between civil/criminal courts (ordinary
courts) and administrative courts. The highest civil/criminal court is the
Court of Cassation. This court is often called the Supreme Court. It can
either uphold or quash decisions of the lower courts. Special courts
review administrative acts, with the Council of State being the most
important of these courts. It has appellate jurisdiction in administrative
legislation and is primarily concerned with the legality of the acts of
public administration.
The Court of Accounts is empowered to review cases involving the
handling of public money and hears cases against public officials
involving their management of public funds. The Constitutional Court
stands outside both the ordinary and administrative judiciary
See MAURO CAPPELLETrI, ET AL., THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM: AN
INTRODUCTION 79-84 (1967).
17. See Rodino, supra note 1, at 285.
18. COST. art. 135, para. 1.
19. COST. art. 135, para. 2.
20. COST. art. 135, para. 5.
21. See Baldassarre, supra note 6, at 653.
22. COST. art. 135, para. 3.
23. See Baldassarre, supra note 6, at 655.
24. See Pizzorusso, supra note 9, at 508.
25. See Baldassarre, supra note 6, at 655.
26. See Pizzorusso, supra note 9, at 508.
27. See Baldassarre, supra note 6, at 655.
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C. Mechanisms to Ensure the Independence of the Judges
As the embodiment of the Constitution, a work intended to
endure indefinitely, the Constitutional Court must be completely
insulated from political influence.28 This includes a freedom from the
interference of either the executive or the legislative branch.29 The
first of these guarantees is found in the Constitution itself. Article
135 mandates that a judge may not hold any other positions or offices
including seemingly innocuous positions such as tenures at
universities or being a company director. In addition, judges are
required to remain completely insulated from political influence, as
implied by the prohibition against judges being affiliated with, or
having membership in, political parties.3
A further guarantee is rooted in the qualifications required of
the judges. As previously noted, a judge can only be chosen from
among judges of the highest courts, university law professors, or
attorneys with at least twenty years experience.32 This requirement
has two purposes. First, only the most brilliant and experienced legal
minds are considered.3 Secondly, it is reasoned that people with
such solid credentials must also have integrity and respect for the
profession.34 It is hoped that the honor in these potential judges will
shield them from the potential complications that could arise.
Another guarantee of independence relates to the secrecy of the
decision making process.35 Unlike many systems, no dissenting
opinions and no records of the votes of the Court are published. 6
This allows the judges to decide in an objective manner, without
having to worry about possible repercussions should the public deem
a decision to be improper.
A judge on the Court may not be removed, exempted, or
suspended from office, without a majority vote of the other judges.37
Criminal charges against a judge may only be brought with the
28. Id. at 652.
29. Id. at 653.
30. See Baldassarre, supra note 6, at 653.
31. COST. art. 135, para. 5.
32. COST. art. 135, para. 2.
33. See Baldassarre, supra note 6, at 654.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. Removal may occur as a result of an unforeseen physical incapacity,
moral unworthiness or serious violations of the duties connected with the office of
judge. In any respect, removal requires a two-thirds majority vote of the Court
itself. See Pizzorusso, supra note 9, at 508.
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authorization of the Court itself." In addition, a judge cannot be
prosecuted, arrested, or deprived of personal liberty, unless caught in
the act of committing a crime for which a warrant or order to seize is
mandatory." On a similar note, any attack on the dignity of the
Court constitutes a crime.4°
A final consideration regards the salary of the judges. Their
salaries are determined by law and cannot be lower than the salary of
the highest member of the judiciary (President of the Court of
Cassation).4' This assurance guards against a judge being fearful that
angry legislators can arbitrarily reduce a salary simply because of
resentment towards unpopular opinions. Further, having these
judges well compensated reflects the belief that their job is of
paramount importance to the preservation of the Italian democratic
society.
D. Functions of the Court
The power granted to the Court is found in Article 134 of the
Constitution. This provision grants the Constitutional Court
jurisdiction over three different types of controversies. First, the
Court may decide on controversies concerning the constitutionality
of State and regional laws, along with acts having the force of law.
Secondly, the Court has jurisdiction when there is a conflict of
jurisdiction between State authorities, between the State and a
Region, or between Regions.43 Finally, the Court is granted power to
hear matters involving Constitutional charges made against either
the President of the Republic, or the Ministers." However, this
provision was later amended, removing the Court's jurisdiction over
38. See Rodino, supra note 1, at 287.
39. See Baldassarre, supra note 6, at 654.
40. See Rodino, supra note 1, at 288.
41. See Baldassarre, supra note 6, at 654.
42. COST. art 134, para. 2.
Italy is composed of twenty-three geographic regions. Each region is
given administrative and legislative powers over matters of regional and
local concern. The acts of the region are closely monitored with the
central government assigning a commissioner to each region in order to
protect national interests. Parliament may negate regional laws that
conflict with the interests of the nation or another region, and the
Constitutional Court can quash laws that are violative of the
Constitution.
See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 16, at 61-63.
43. COST. art 134, para. 3.
44. The Council of Ministers (Ministers) is the body that has the power to
initiate legislation in Parliament.
[Vol. 19:2
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the impeachment of a Minister.45 As a result, if a Minister commits a
crime in the exercise of his or her official function, he or she is no
longer immune to the jurisdiction of the lower courts. 6 In summary,
the Court acts in a judicial manner and exists to protect the
Constitution and ensure that legislation does not violate its
fundamental principles.47
The Constitutional Court is empowered to determine the
constitutionality of laws passed by the legislature. 4' Yet, the Court is
also required to abstain from all political activity. 9 Obviously it is
difficult to reconcile these conflicting principles. In an attempt to
cure this dilemma, it was declared that the "evaluation of a political
nature and any review of the use of the discretionary powers of
Parliament" are forbidden. ° In essence, the Court must stay out of
the political affairs of the legislature. However, as a practical matter,
this is a very tough task. In the past the Court has been criticized for
having overstepped its authority, and meddled in the political arena.51
Conversely, some have argued that the Court has not gone far
enough in controlling the activities of Parliament.2
The Court also has jurisdiction when an individual citizen's
rights are being violated. 3 If a person currently involved in a court
proceeding believes that his constitutional rights have been
impinged, a petition may be made to the lower court to have the
issue raised before the Constitutional Court.' If the lower court
judge deems the request to be reasonable, the matter is referred to
the Constitutional Court.5 The current proceedings of the lower
court are then suspended until the Court rules on the constitutional
issue. 6 This process thereby grants the Constitutional Court indirect
review to determine if the party's constitutional rights have in fact
been violated. Because the review is done on a case by case basis, if
the Court rules the activity to be constitutional, future parties are not
prevented from making a similar challenge.57
45. Constitutional Law No. 1 of January 16, 1989, as cited in Rodino, supra
note 1, at 287.
46. See Rodino, supra note 1, at 288.
47. See Baldassarre, supra note 6, at 650.
48. COST. art. 134, para. 2.
49. COST. art. 135, para. 5.
50. Art. 28 of Law No. 87 of 1953, as cited in Rodino, supra note 1, at 289.
51. See Rodino, supra note 1, at 289.
52. Id.
53. See Baldassarre, supra note 6, at 651.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Law of March 11, 1953, as cited in Pizzorusso, supra note 9, at 531.
57. Id.
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Originally, there was great debate over whether the Court
should have the power to review legislation that was enacted before
the Constitution went into force. The Court considered this question
to be important enough to be its very first issue ever decided.58 It was
determined that the court should have the competence to review
laws enacted prior to 1948."9
E. Indirect Review
During the course of judicial proceedings in the ordinary courts,
either party or the Public Prosecutor may petition the lower court
and officially question the constitutional legitimacy of a law.6° The
referring court must make a preliminary assessment of the relevance
of the issue, and determine if a Constitutional Court referral is
necessary in order to resolve the case fairly.6 If the judge decides
that the issue of constitutionality is essential for the resolution of the
case, then the issue is forwarded to the Constitutional Court and the
current proceedings are suspended.6
Once the lower court refers a case, the President of the
Constitutional Court selects a judge to prepare a preliminary report
for the Court.63 The purpose of this report is to determine if the
appeal is warranted.' There are six factors that go into determining
whether the Constitutional Court should intervene: 1) the referring
authority must be a court;65 2) the challenged act must have the force
of legislation; 3) the constitutional issue must be relevant to the
outcome of the case; 4) there cannot be a prior declaration that the
question is inadmissible; 5) it must be possible to identify a specific
58. Decision No. 1, 1956, as cited in Rodino, supra note 1, at 289. Judicial
decisions in Italy are not cited by the names of the parties, but only by their
number and year. See Pizzorusso, supra note 9, n.23.
59. Decision No. 1, 1956, as cited in Rodino, supra note 1, at 289.
60. Law of March 11, 1953, as cited in Pizzorusso, supra note 9, at 531.
61. Law of March 11, 1953, No. 87, art. 24(1), as cited in Pizzorusso, supra note
9, at 516.
62. The question of the constitutional illegitimacy of a law or an act of the
Republic with force of law, raised ex officio or alleged by one of the parties in the
course of a trial, and not evidently considered unfounded by the judge, must be
referred to the Constitutional Court for its consideration. See 1948 Constitutional
Statute No. 1, Article 1.
63. See Pizzorusso, supra note 9, at 519.
64. Id.
65. The lower court may make the referral to the Constitutional Court based
on a motion by either party or by the Public Prosecutor. Also, if the lower court
believes that constitutional review is necessary, that court may refer the issue sua
sponte. See Pizzorusso, supra note 9, at 516.
[Vol. 19:2
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constitutional issue; and 6) notice must be given of the referral. 66 If
these factors are met, then the Court will proceed with a hearing
after giving the parties at least twenty days notice.67
The hearing consists of an analysis of the materials submitted by
the lower court judge, followed by argument by the parties.' The
Court then meets to discuss the case. In an indirect referral, the
Court must interpret the provision so as to apply it to the current fact
situation.69 There is a minimum of eleven judges that must attend the
discussion.7° A majority rule is in affect, with the President's vote as
the tiebreaker.7 Once a decision is reached, the President nominates
a judge to draft an opinion that is signed by all of the judges as the
decision of the Court.72
F. Direct Review
Article 127 of the Constitution provides that, "When the
Government of the Republic considers that a law approved by the
Regional Council exceeds the competence of the Region or conflicts
with the interests of the Nation... the Government of the Republic
may ... raise the question before the Constitutional Court." 73 This is
called direct review.
The procedure for direct review only slightly differs from that of
indirect review. The presence of the parties is required in direct
review, but parties need not be present in indirect review.74 In
addition, the Court in direct review can consider all possible
interpretations of the challenged legislation.75
G. Effects of a Constitutional Court Decision
As previously articulated, the Constitutional Court does not
decide on disputes between parties, but instead settles questions
arising as a result of conflicts with the constitution.7 6 Therefore, there
are only two ways the Court can decide a case: either rule that there
66. Id. at 522.
67. Id. at 520.
6& Id. The parties themselves need not attend argument before the Court.
An appearance is only required in a direct review case.
69. Id. at 514.
70. See Baldassarre, supra note 6, at 655.
71. Id.
72. See Pizzorusso, supra note 9, at 520.
73. COST. art. 127.
74. See Rodino, supra note 1, at 293.
75. See Pizzorusso, supra note 9, at 514.
76. See Baldassarre, supra note 6, at 651.
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is conformance with the constitution 77 or declare the legislation
void. When the Court declares that a provision of a law, or of an act
having the force of law, is unconstitutional, the provision ceases to
have effect from the day following the publication of the decision."
The Court may also declare a statute to be partially void, in which
case the Court re-words the statute in order to make the legislation
conform to the Constitution.8°
When the Court decides issues of a criminal nature, there is a
different effect. If the case involved procedural criminal issues, the
ruling does not apply to prior cases.8' There is an ex post facto effect
given to the Constitutional Court's determination.82 If however, it is
a case involving substantive criminal law, prior cases get the benefit
of this decision." A criminal conviction made pursuant to a norm
declared unconstitutional becomes of no effect.8' Therefore,
procedural rules subsequently ruled unconstitutional have no effect
on prior decisions. However, substantive criminal laws later
determined to be unconstitutional will benefit a person convicted
based on that rule.
With background materials regarding the Constitutional Court
having been fully discussed, this Comment will now focus on how the
court has handled the controversial issues of abortion and gender
equality.
III. Abortion Law in Italy
A. The Early Decisions
It is only a recent development that abortion was legalized in
Italy.n5 Prior to World War II, abortion was considered a crime
77. The legislation may be deemed constitutional on its face, or the Court may
alter the wording to make it constitutional. See Baldassarre, supra note 6, at 652.
78. Id.
79. COST. art. 136 para. 1.
80. See Baldassarre, supra note 6, at 652. When it is decided that a statute can
be cured with the alteration of the wording, there must be a majority vote on the
precise wording. Id. The Court will use as few words as possible to make the
statute conform to the constitution. Id.
81. See Pizzorusso, supra note 9, at 524.
82- Id.
83. Id.
84. Art. 30 of Ordinary Law No. 87 of 1953, as cited in Pizzorusso, supra note
9, at 524.
85. Charles Stanley Ross, The Right of Privacy and Restraints on Abortion
Under the "Undue Burden" Test. A Jurisprudential Comparison of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey With European Practice and Italian Law, 3 IND. INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 199, 220 (1993).
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against the family. 6 When Italy was under fascist rule during the
Second World War, abortion was considered so contemptuous, that
it was regarded as a crime against the entire "race."87 This was the
state of the law until the 1970's.
In 1971, the Constitutional Court ruled that it was
unconstitutional to prohibit the publicity of contraceptive methods.88
After this liberal decision, pressure to reform abortion laws grew.
The current laws developed during the latter half of the decade.'
The present abortion laws are derived in large part, from a
Constitutional Court ruling of 1975."' The Court held that the
fundamental rights of the mother are superior to that of the
developing fetus." In addition, the Court advanced the idea that the
health of the mother, who is already a person, should outweigh the
health of the embryo, which will only later become a person."
Finally, the Court ordered the legislature to take the necessary
precautions to ensure that if abortions are performed, they are done
only to avoid danger to the mother.' The Court wanted to make
certain there are safeguards in place to make sure that mothers are
making informed and intelligent decisions.95
This 1975 law expressly declared article 546 of the penal code
unconstitutional, because it prohibited all abortions.96 The Court
ruled that the penal code must recognize that pregnancy may be
interrupted "when further development of the gestation could imply
injury or danger which is grave, medically ascertained... and not
otherwise avoidable for the health of the mother."9 Thus, the time
was ripe for major change in the state of Italian abortion law.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Ross, supra note 85, at 220.
91. Decision of the Italian Constitutional Court of February 18, 1975, as cited
in Ross, supra note 85, at 231 n.6.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Decision of the Italian Constitutional Court of February 18, 1975, as cited
in Ross, supra note 85, at 231 n.6.
97. Id.
2001]
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B. The 1978 Law on Abortion
The current status of Italian abortion law emanates from Law
No. 194 of 1978.98 This law begins with a recognition that human life
shall be protected from inception and that individuals are guaranteed
a right to responsible and planned parenthood. 99 The law provides
that abortion shall not be a means of birth control, and to that end
state and local agencies are mandated to develop mediosocial
services in order to prevent abortion from being used for the purpose
of birth control. °°
The next section of the Italian abortion law deals with the
specific requirements of the aforementioned service centers. The
woman must be informed of her rights regarding social, health, and
welfare services available in her area.'0 1 The pregnant female must
also be made aware of labor law designed to protect expecting
mothers. °2 The centers are also directed to reach out to the female
and help her deal with unforeseeable problems that cannot be
adequately dealt with through normal avenues. - Finally, the agency
is supposed to help the woman overcome the factors that have lead
her to consider terminating the pregnancy in the first place."' It is
clear from this law that abortion is a last resort to be considered only
when all other alternatives have been exhausted.
To show that abortion is really only meant as a last resort, the
counseling centers were allocated great deals of public money from
which they are expected to meet the needs of expectant mothers.05
An annual disbursement of fifty billion lira, to be divided among the
country, was mandated." This was seen as a great sign of progress
98. See Ross, supra note 85, at 220.
99. Art. 2 of Law No. 194 of May 22, 1978, as cited in Ross, supra note 85, at
231 n.120.
100. Id.
101. Art. 2 of Law No. 194 of May 22, 1978, as cited in Ross, supra note 85, at
220.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Ross, supra note 85, at 222.
106. Art. 3 of Law No. 194 of May 22, 1978. In order for the family counseling
centers to fulfill the tasks assigned by the present law, their financial support.., is
hereby increased by an annual disbursement of fifty billion lira (approximately 2.7
million U.S. dollars at 1 U.S. dollar = 1800 lira), to be divided among the base
districts following the criteria established by the aforementioned article... The
Minister of the Treasury is authorized to carry out, through appropriate decrees,
the necessary variations to achieve balance. See Ross, supra note 85, at 231.
[Vol. 19:2
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because the country showed its willingness to spend public money in
the very personal area of abortion."
1. Duties of Medical Personnel- Specific procedures were set
out for medical professionals to follow once a woman expresses her
desire to abort her pregnancy. Counseling centers must guarantee
the woman receives the necessary medical examinations."" Secondly,
agencies are to be motivated by the "impact of economic, social, or
family circumstances upon the pregnant woman's health. ' '
Consultations are to be done in which professionals meet with the
woman and, where the woman consents, the father of the
"conceptus" in order to try and overcome the factors which have led
her to seek an abortion." ° Further, the staff of the counseling centers
must enable the mother to take advantage of her rights as a working
mother, and provide her with all necessary assistance both during
and after the pregnancy."' The same abortion procedures are
followed whether the woman reports to a doctor of her choice or if
she seeks the assistance of a state-sponsored clinic."2
If, after a careful consideration of the surrounding
circumstances, the physician finds that termination is urgently
required, the physician must immediately give the woman document-
ation which certifies that abortion is necessary."3 Once the woman
has been issued the certificate, she may report to any establishment
authorized to perform an abortion, and have her pregnancy
terminated.1
4
The procedure differs if the physician, after considering all the
particular facts, finds that the abortion is not necessary. The
physician is instructed to then issue the woman another document
which attests to the fact that the woman is in fact pregnant and seeks
an abortion."5 It further directs her to reflect on her decision for a
seven-day period."6 After the seven-day waiting period has elapsed,
the woman may take the document she was given and report to an
107. See Ross, supra note 85, at 222.
108. Art. 5 of Law No. 194 of May 22, 1978, as cited in Ross, supra note 85, at
231 n.122.
109. Id.
110. Id. The Italian abortion statute does not require husband/father
notification in order to have an abortion. See Ross, supra note 85, at 223.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Ross, supra note 85, at 223.
116. Id.
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authorized establishment in order to have an abortion performed.'17
It is apparent through analysis of the abortion law that the Italian
legislature wanted to ensure that pregnancy was terminated only
when absolutely necessary to the health of the mother, or after the
mother was given adequate time to reflect on her decision.
2. Conscientious Objection-A unique feature of the Italian
law is the conscientious objector provision. This allows health-care
personnel to declare in advance if they do not wish to participate in
abortion procedures."8 This declaration must be forwarded to the
provincial medical officer at or near the time one enters a position in
which they may be exposed to individuals seeking abortions."9 The
law allows this objection to be withdrawn at any time, in which case
the physician is no longer exempted from providing his services.2 If
one declares an objection, they are not exempted from providing
care before and after the termination of the pregnancy.12' The
physician is only exempted from participation in the actual abortion
procedure.'22 Finally, if intervention is required in order to save the
life of a woman in imminent danger, a physician is bound to act
regardless of their objection.'" This action may include providing an
abortion.
2 4
Many critics of the abortion law argue that the conscientious
objector provisions make abortions too difficult to procure in a
country such as Italy, which is almost entirely Catholic and very
outspoken in its anti-abortion views.ln As a result, some contend
117. Id.
118. Art. 9 of Law No. 194 of May 22, 1978, as cited in Ross, supra note 85, at
231 n.123 states:
Health personnel and allied health personnel shall not be required to
assist in the procedures referred to in Section 5 and 7 or in pregnancy
terminations if they have a conscientious objection, declared in advance.
Such declaration must be forwarded to the provincial medical officer and,
in the case of personnel on the staff of the hospital or the nursing home,
to the medical director, not later than one month following the entry into
force of this Law, or the date of qualification, or the date of
commencement of employment at an establishment required to provide
services for the termination of pregnancy, or the date of the drawing up
of a convention with insurance agencies entailing the provision of such
services....
Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Art. 9 of Law No. 194 of May 22, 1978, as cited in Ross, supra note 85, at
231 n.123.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Ross, supra note 85, at 224, 225.
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that a black-market is created in which abortions are done in an
unregulated environment.126
3. Parental Notification-In Italy, minors are required to
notify a parent of their decision to have an abortion, unless a judge
finds serious grounds which make notification impossible or
inadvisable. 27 This issue has proven to be very controversial and has
resulted in two referendums.'8 One referendum sought to liberalize
the law by extending abortion to minors without any parental
notification requirement."' A second referendum strove to restrict
abortion by only permitting it under certain life-threatening
situations.'9 However, the Italian citizenry voted to keep the law in
tact and require parental notification, as long as there continues to be
an adequate judicial bypass procedure through which a judge may
intervene."'
Challenges to the Constitutional Court regarding abortion law
are usually one of two types. The parental notification requirement
for minors and the conscientious objector provision for doctors are
among the most contentious elements of Italian abortion law.'33
However, for more than two decades the abortion law has remained
126. Id. at 225.
127. Art. 12 of Law No. 194 of May 22, 1978, as cited in Ross, supra note 85, at
231 n.125.
Requests for pregnancy termination under the procedures prescribed by
this Law shall be made in person by the woman. Where the woman is
under 18 years of age, the consent of the person exercising parental
authority over the woman or her guardian shall be required for the
termination of pregnancy. However, during the first 90 days, if there are
serious grounds rendering it impossible or inadvisable to consult the
persons exercising parental authority or the guardian, or if those persons
are consulted but refuse their consent or express conflicting opinions, the
counseling center or mediosocial agency, or the physician of the woman's
choice, shall carry out the procedures set out in Section 5 and submit to
the magistrate responsible for matters of guardianship [giudice tutelare]
in the locality in which it operates, not later than seven days following a
request, a report giving its views on the matter. Within five days, after
interviewing the woman and taking account of her wishes, the grounds
which she puts forward, and the report submitted to him, the magistrate
may issue a decision, which shall not be subject to appeal, authorizing the
woman to have her pregnancy terminated.
Id.
128. See Ross, supra note 85, at 225, 226.
129. Id. at 126.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 226.
132 Id. at 227.
133. See Ross, supra note 85, at 227.
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intact despite the many attacks that have ultimately reached the
Constitutional Court.'3
The Comment will now focus on an examination of another
controversial subject: the equal rights of women.
IV. Gender Equality
A. Gender Equality Under the Republican Constitution
The principle of equality is first articulated in the "Fundamental
Principles" section of the Constitution."' Article 3 begins by
establishing that all citizens are considered equal before the law,
without distinction based on gender.36 However, it is apparent that
the drafters recognized that these words alone would not be enough
to curtail discrimination. The article concludes by mandating the
removal of all barriers that stand in the way of social development.
Gender equality is specifically discussed in Article 37 of the
Constitution.138 Among other things, the article provided that
women should receive the same pay as men, if they are doing the
same work.139 However, the phrase "essential family function of
women" was used, which made the passage especially vague."'4 After
all, if equality was sought, why did women have any more of an
"essential family function" than men? 14 It was generally agreed that
134. Id. at 228.
135. Paolo Wright-Carozza, Organic Goods: Legal Understandings of Work,
Parenthood, and Gender Equality in Comparative Perspective, 81 CAL. L. REV.
531,536.
136. COST. art. 3. See also n.3.
137. Id.
13 See Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 538. Article 37 reads as follows:
Women workers have the same rights and the same remuneration for equal work
as men workers. Their conditions of work must allow the fulfillment of their
essential family functions, and assure to mother and child special and adequate
protection .... Id.
139. COST. art. 37.
140. See Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 539.
141. It was argued by the Constitutional Assembly that Article 37's "essential
family function" clause referred solely to the woman's biological role in child
bearing. Yet Article 31 specifically protects motherhood: "The Republic shall, by
economic and other measures, assist the institution of the family and the
fulfillment of its tasks, with particular regard to large families. It shall protect
motherhood, infancy, and youth by promoting institutions necessary for that
purpose."
Because motherhood was addressed in Article 31, a controversy revolved
around exactly what the framers had in mind by the "essential family function"
language of Article 37. Was the importance of the family simply being reiterated,
or were the framers trying to keep women confined to their traditional domestic
[Vol. 19:2
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the provision perpetuated gender discrimination by relegating
women to domestic duties and regarding men as the family's wage
142
earner.
B. Movements for Equal Rights Subsequent to the Constitution
It was obvious that the Constitution would not offer much of a
cure to gender discrimination. Many of the existing laws were still
around from the fascist era before World War II."43 As a result,
movements surfaced to take advantage of the ambiguous language in
Article 37 and get tougher laws against gender-based discrimination
passed.
The first such campaign attempted to modernize laws regarding
pregnant women in the workplace. 44 This 1950 Act was a huge step
towards protecting women's rights in the workplace.45 This law
required maternity leave before and after pregnancy, and guaranteed
women their job after their maternity leave was over.' This law was
an important advancement, as it put teeth into Article 3 of the
Constitution. The legislature for the first time removed barriers that
impeded social equality. It appeared that gender equality was no
longer going to be an empty promise.
Great strives were made in the 1960s also as legislation was
passed that barred employers from firing females because of their
marriage. 47 But, perhaps the most important decision of all was
advanced by the Constitutional Court, when in 1969 the
interpretation of Article 37 was first considered.'4 The Court sought
a balance between the competing principles of equality and the
roles?
142. See Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 539, 540.
143. Id. at 540.
144. Id. at 541.
145. This law required women to take a maternity leave of six weeks prior to
and eight weeks after childbirth. It also provided women with eighty percent of
their normal pay during the leave period, which was to be sustained by the social
security system. Finally, the new law prohibited employers from firing women
during pregnancy and for one year after childbirth, which guaranteed their jobs
after returning from leave. See Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 541.
146. Law of 26 Aug. 1950, No. 860, art. 5 Gazz. Uff. No. 253, 3 Nov. 1950, as
cited in Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 592 n.37.
147. Law of 9 Jan. 1963, No. 7 Gazz. Uff. 27, 30 Jan. 1963, as cited in Wright-
Carozza, supra note 135, at 592 n.46. Previously, employers would commonly
terminate young married females, as an imminent pregnancy was anticipated.
Thus, the employer would avoid the application of the maternity laws. See Wright-
Carozza, supra note 135, at 542.
14& See Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 542.
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traditional notion of female homemaker.4 9 The Court recognized
the importance of both objectives and decided that the purpose of
the constitution was to achieve compatibility between each woman's
role in the workplace and in the family.'o The female should be able
to avoid "the dilemma of having to sacrifice employment in order to
safeguard her liberty to give life to a new family, or, vice versa to
have to renounce this fundamental right in order to avoid
unemployment."'' With this decision it was apparent that the
Constitutional Court interpreted the constitution as protecting both
the woman's right to a family and the woman's right to be free of
unfair employment practices.
In the coming years, the impetus for further rights grew. In
1971, the Law for Working Mothers was passed.'52 This law
provided, inter alia, an extension of the mandatory leave period, and
prohibited employers from assigning dangerous or unhealthy work to
pregnant workers or women who had recently given birth.'53 The law
also increased sanctions against employers who violated any of these
maternity laws.m
Although clearly a step in the right direction for the protection
of the traditional family unit, many critics felt that this law was
actually a step backwards for females. The law merely adjusted
labor conditions so that females could continue to occupy the role as
homemaker.5 The law insinuated that the primary duty of the
female was to bear children, but the right to work will also be
protected and available.'57
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Corte Cost., 5 Mar. 1969, 92 Foro It. I 545, as cited in Wright-Carozza,
supra note 135, at 592.
152. Law of 30 Dec. 1971, No. 1204, Gazz. Uff. No. 14, 18 Jan. 1972, as cited in
Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 592.
153. See Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 542. The 1971 law prohibited
employers from assigning dangerous, heavy, or unhealthy work during pregnancy
and for seven months after childbirth. The period of mandatory leave was
extended to two months prior to the presumed date of delivery and three months
afterwards, still at eighty percent of normal pay. During an optional six months of
additional leave, the mother received thirty percent of her normal pay under the
new law, at public expense. See Law of December 30, 1971.
154. Law of 30 Dec. 1971, No. 1204, Gazz. Uff. No. 14, 18 Jan. 1972, as cited in
Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 592.
155. See Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 544.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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C. The Equal Treatment Act (ETA) of 1977
Spurred by the Equal Treatment Directive passed by the
Council of the European Community, the purpose of the Equal
Treatment Act (ETA) was to effectuate the principle of equal
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment and
notions of the family."' The ETA invalidated any remaining
legislation that restricted women's work. 59 It also prohibited direct
or indirect discrimination based on sex, guaranteed equal pay for
identical work, and generally equalized social benefits for male and
female workers. 16  Finally, the ETA promoted the shared
responsibility by the mother and father of child-rearing
responsibilities. Under the new law, a father as well as a mother was
now allowed to take a leave of absence in order to care for a child.6
In the past, this leave was only available to the mother.'62
D. The Role of the Constitutional Court
Four different lower court cases were indirectly referred 63 to the
Constitutional Court in order to decide the constitutionality of the
1971 maternity law. 6' In all four cases, the plaintiffs were fathers of
newborns whose mothers had died or become incapacitated as a
result of labor complications." The fathers requested that the leave
periods available to women in the 1971 law be extended to fathers as
well.'6
In its analysis, the Court started by considering the rationale
behind the 1971 maternity law.67 On its face the law was intended to
safeguard the health of mothers and pregnant women, give them job
security, and help them overcome financial burdens associated with
maternity. 68 However, the Court went deeper in its examination and
concluded that the overriding concern was the best interests of the
158. Law of 9 Dec. 1977, No. 903, Gazz. Uff. No. 343, 17 Dec. 1977, as cited in
Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 592.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Law of 30 Dec. 1971, No. 1204, Gazz.Uff. No. 14, 18 Jan. 1972, as cited in
Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 592.
163. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
164. See Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 549.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Corte Cost., 19 Jan. 1987, 110 Foro It. 313, 314, as cited in Wright-Carozza,
supra note 135, at 592. See also Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 549.
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child.16 9 All of the provisions and accommodations that were
advanced to the mothers were to increase the chance that the babies
are born healthy and the mother was able to provide for the child
without having to worry about seeking new employment.17"
Next, the Court considered the 1977 ETA. The Court ruled that
the ETA promoted "a new vision of the roles of the parents in family
life, and in particular of the way in which they contribute to the
assistance of their children with equal rights and duties."'' Because
the 1977 law extended child care leave to fathers, the Court
supported their original premise that the best interests of the child is
to be of paramount importance."
The Court ruled that the 1971 maternity law was
unconstitutional because it guaranteed women a three month leave
after childbirth, but did not guarantee similar rights to the father,
even when the mother was incapacitated or deceased.'73 For these
reasons, the Court extended the ETA's benefits to fathers including
the right to a three-month leave after the child is born.'74
Several years later, the Constitutional Court was faced with a
similar case in which the father sought to take the three-month
mandatory maternity leave in place of the mother, who renounced
her right to do so."' The lower court referred the case to the
Constitutional Court because the law treated the father differently
from the mother with respect to his right to participate in the early
phases of the child's life.
176
The Court used a similar analysis as the 1987 case, and extended
maternity laws to include fathers." The Court went on to articulate
that laws that treat men and women differently are inherently
unconstitutional. Because the legislation did not grant leave to the
father in place of the mother, it violated the constitution's guarantee
of equality of the spouses, protection of families, and protection of
minors (Articles 29, 30, and 31).' 7
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 551.
173. Id. at 548.
174. Corte cost., 19 Jan. 1987, 110 Foro It. I 313, 314, as cited in Wright-
Carozza, supra note 135, at 592 n.94. See also Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at
551.
175. See Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 551.
176. Id.
177. Corte Cost., 15 July 1991, 114 Foro It. I 2297, 2299, as cited in Wright-
Carozza, supra note 135, at 592 n.116.
178. See Wright-Carozza, supra note 135, at 552. Article 29 provides:
The Republic recognizes the rights of the family as a natural social unit
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V. Conclusion
Clearly in its infancy, as compared to other more established
legal bodies, the Italian Constitutional Court has in its early years
proven to be a praiseworthy tribunal. The framers of the
Constitution intended the judges on this Court to be independent
and nonpartisan. The drafters would likely be very pleased with the
way the Constitutional Court has safeguarded and protected the
democratic ideals contained within the Republican Constitution of
1948.
The abortion issue was especially divisive. In a country that is
overwhelmingly Catholic, and as a result inherently opposed to the
idea of abortion, the 1975 ruling allowing abortion was particularly
shocking. Public outrage followed and the Court took a great deal of
criticism from all segments of the population including the media, the
Catholic Church, and the general public. Nevertheless, the Court did
not waver and the decision has lasted twenty-five years. It has
perhaps even become more liberal through various legislative
enactments.
The abortion decision exemplifies exactly why the creators of
the Constitution sought an independent Constitutional Court that
would not yield to popular sentiment. With an issue so controversial,
it would be tough for anyone to remain objective. But, the judges on
the Court realized that they were entrusted with safeguarding the
constitution. The Court did its job as proscribed by the constitution
and did what they thought was best for the future of a democratic
Italy.
Similarly, the battle for equal rights was also very heated.
Italian society has historically been patriarchal, and many thought
that it was simply unheard of for women to enjoy equal rights as
men. However, societal changes worldwide spurred a movement for
greater female rights, especially in the workplace.
When the issue first reached the Constitutional Court in the late
1960s, the Court recognized the problems that women were having
balancing employment and family needs. As a result, legislation was
passed that regulated how employers were to treat pregnant female
employees. In time, the Court ruled that any legislation treating
males and females differently was inherently unconstitutional. Males
founded on marriage. Marriage is founded on the moral and legal
equality of the spouses ... Article 30 provides: It is the duty and right of
parents to maintain, instruct, and educate their children .... In cases of
incapacity of the parents, the law shall provide for the fulfillment of their
duties.
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were even allowed to take maternity leave based on a Constitutional
Court decision in 1991.
Once again, the Court decided a very controversial matter in a
non-biased manner. The judges realized that the constitution
warranted judgments that may be less than popular. However, the
Court performed their duty with the constitution and the best
interests of Italy as their only guides.
These issues are illustrative of how the Constitutional Court has
done such an honorable job preserving the framer's ideals of more
than fifty years ago. As a result, the Italian Constitution remains
strong and endures as a universal symbol of democracy.
Daniel S. Dengler
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Appendix A
The "fundamental principles" can be summarized as follows:
Article 1- "Italy is a democratic republic founded on work." All
people enjoy sovereignty within the limits of the Constitution.
-Article 2- The "Republic recognizes and guarantees the inviol-
able rights of man". . . and requires the performance of "fundamental
duties of political, economic, and social solidarity."
Article 3- "All citizens have equal social standing and are equal
before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion,
political opinion, or social and personal conditions."... The
Republic shall remove obstacles that impede the development or
participation of all workers.
Article 4- All citizens have the right to work. Each citizen has a
duty to exercise an activity that contributes to the greater good of
society.
Article 5- The Republic shall encourage local autonomy and
decentralization.
Article 6- Linguistic minorities shall be protected.
Article 7- The State and the Catholic Church shall be exclusive
of one another.
Article 8- All religious creeds are by law considered equal, and
each shall have the right to organize themselves.
Article 9- The Republic shall promote the development of
culture and seek the protection of the historical and artistic heritage
of the nation.
Article 10- The Italian legal systems should be in conformity
with established standards of international law... Foreigners shall
have the right to asylum in the Republic without fear of extradition
for political offenses.
Article 11- "Italy renounces war as an instrument of offense
against the liberty of other peoples and as a means of resolving
international disputes; she will agree, on conditions of equality with
other states, to the limitations of her sovereignty necessary to an
organization for assuring peace and justice among nations; and will
promote and favor international organizations constituted for this
purpose."
Article 12- The Italian flag shall consist of vertical stripes of
green, white, and red.
See ITALY COST. ART. 1-12
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